Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks
RFC 5961, “Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks”, is a Proposed Standard document published in August 2010 by A. Ramaiah, R. Stewart, M. Dalal. It has since been updated by RFC 9293. The canonical text is published by the RFC Editor.
Abstract
TCP has historically been considered to be protected against spoofed off-path packet injection attacks by relying on the fact that it is difficult to guess the 4-tuple (the source and destination IP addresses and the source and destination ports) in combination with the 32-bit sequence number(s). A combination of increasing window sizes and applications using longer-term connections (e.g., H-323 or Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [STANDARDS-TRACK]
What “Proposed Standard” means
An entry-level standards-track specification: stable, peer-reviewed and a solid basis for implementation, though it may still evolve before becoming an Internet Standard.
The canonical text of RFC 5961 is hosted at rfc-editor.org. Available in TXT,HTML.
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